Distributional Effects in Household Models: Separate Spheres and Income Pooling by Browning, Martin et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Distributional Effects in Household Models
Browning, Martin; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Lechene, Valérie
Publication date:
2005
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Browning, M., Chiappori, P-A., & Lechene, V. (2005). Distributional Effects in Household Models:  Separate
Spheres and Income Pooling. Cph.: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2020
CAM 
 
Centre for Applied  
Microeconometrics 
 
Institute of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
http://www.econ.ku.dk/CAM/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distributional Effects in Household Models:  
Separate Spheres and Income Pooling 
 
Martin Browning, Pierre-André Chiappori and Valérie Lechene 
 
2005-08 
 
 
 
 
The activities of CAM are financed by a grant from 
The Danish National Research Foundation 
Distributional e¤ects in household models:
separate spheres and income pooling.
Martin Browningy, Pierre-André Chiapporizand Valérie Lechenex
June 6, 2005
Abstract
We derive distributional e¤ects for a non-cooperative alternative to the
unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of
a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that,
in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to di¤erent public
goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case
corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993).
The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be
in di¤erent regimes depending on the distribution of income within the
household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a
breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that
targetting benets such as child benets to one household member may
not always have an e¤ect on outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Using policy to channel resources towards certain types of individuals within
households, thereby exogenously altering the intra-household distribution of in-
come, is an instrument often used by governments, typically to further the wel-
fare of children. Such transfers are usually put in the hands of women, on the
basis of the belief that additional resources to mothers, over and above the level
of income they generate by choice, leads to additional power in the allocation of
these resources and to additional resources going to children. In contrast with
an abundance of evidence from sociology and anthropology, economic evidence
on these phenomena is relatively scarce. Two reasons can be invoked to justify
this. On the one hand, scarcity of data has hampered progress on this issue,
and on the other, suitable conceptual tools have been developed only relatively
recently. In the standard unitaryapproach to household behavior, for instance,
income is pooled at the household level and the identity of the recipient is irrel-
evant. Thus the issue of targetingbenets to one household member can only
be analyzed outside the unitary framework.
Non unitary models can be classied into two broad categories, depending on
whether they assume cooperation (hence Pareto e¢ ciency) or non cooperation.
Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) have recently analyzed the targeting
issue in a cooperative context. In the non-cooperative framework, two main
avenues have been explored. One relies on non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
and private provision of public goods. An alternative approach, introduced by
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) relies on a separate spheresapproach, whereby
in the absence of cooperation each individual within the household specializes
into specic tasks (for instance, those that are traditionallyassigned to their
gender). While intuitively appealing, the notion of separate sphereshas not
been given a sound theoretical underpinning.
The main goal of the present contribution is to extend existing results, and
to clarify the links between the Nash equilibriumand separate spheresap-
proaches. In doing this we provide a framework which contains all current
suggestions as special cases. We consider a model in which agents decide on the
provision of several public goods; in this context, we analyze the Nash equilib-
rium with voluntary contributions. We rst extend the local income pooling
result of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al (1986) to this context and show that
when both partners are contributing to at least one public good, household de-
mands for all goods are independent of individual incomes and only depend on
aggregate household resources. This suggests that, in a non-cooperative context,
the scope of policies targeting a specic member as the main (or only) recipient
of a given benet may be narrow, since this choice may fail to inuence the
households decision.
Second, and more interestingly, we show that in general there is at most
one public good to which both agents contribute. Hence all public commodities
but possibly one are exclusively provided by one agent only. Furthermore, in
a wide set of circumstances, the sets of public goods to which each person
contributes are disjoint; i.e., each person chooses to contribute to a di¤erent
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set of public goods than the other. Hence the important conclusion that the
separate spheresmodel of Lundberg and Pollak (1993) is but a sub-case of the
general, non-cooperative approach. Individual specialization, in this context,
need not be assumed initially; rather, it emerges endogenously as an equilibrium
feature. Finally, the denition of the individual spherescan be endogenised; we
show how it is determined by individual preferences and the within household
distribution of income.
Two additional remarks can be made. First, our result has a wider bear-
ing than intra-household allocation, as the Nash equilibrium is often used to
represent situations involving large number of agents and of goods, for instance
the provision of public goods in society. Second, the scope of our conclusions is
not limited to non-cooperative models. Several existing contributions consider
cooperative models based on Nash bargaining, with individual outside options
modeled as stemming from non-cooperative solutions (either non-cooperative
or separate spheres). Since bargaining outcomes inherit the features of the un-
derlying non-cooperative outcomes, the local income pooling result applies to
this context as well.
2 Nash equilibriumwith voluntary contributions
to the public goods
2.1 Framework
We consider a two person (I = A;B with A being a sheand B being a he)
household which faces xed prices (which we normalise to unity) and allo-
cates a given income between di¤erent goods. Agent J has income Y J , and
Y = Y A + Y B denotes the households total income. We assume in all that
follows that goods are either public or private1 and that each person has a rep-
resentable preference ordering over the within household allocation of goods.
Denote person Is n vector of their private good by qI and let the m vector
of public goods be denoted Q. Let q = qA + qB be the vector of household
consumption of the private good.
The household budget constraint is:
Q0e+ q0e = Y (1)
where e is the appropriately sized unit vector. Preferences are assumed to be
egoistic, in the sense that each persons utility function is dened over public
goods and the individuals private consumption, I
 
qI ;Q

.2
1We could allow that goods have the possibility of having both a private and a public
nature; this complicates the notation without adding anything of substance.
2The analysis below can easily be extended to the case in which there is caring. We shall
return to this in the conclusion.
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2.2 Denition and existence
In the Nash equilibrium with voluntary contributions to the public goods, each
individual chooses how to allocate their income between the private goods and
the amounts they contribute to the public goods, given the level of contributions
of the other individual to the public goods. The households expenditure on a
public good is the sum of the individual contributions to that public good.3
A solution in this problem is a vector of contributions to the public goods
(gA;gB) such that each individuals belief are conrmed in equilibrium, that
is such that (qJ;gJ); J = A;B are solutions of the programs:8<: MaxqJ ;gJ U
J(qJ ;gA+gB)
qJ0e+ gJ0e = Y J
gJi  0; i = 1; :::;m
(2)
This program can be rewritten equivalently in terms of private goods and of
public goods for the household. For A:8<: MaxqA;Q U
A(qA;Q)
qA0e+Q0e = Y A + gB0e
Q  gB
(3)
One can write a similar program for B, with B choosing the quantity of private
goods he consumes and the quantity of public goods the household consumes in
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Assume that UA and UB are continuously di¤erentiable and
strictly quasi concave. Then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. The proof relies on a standard xed point argument.
2.3 Properties of the Nash equilibrium
We now study the features of Nash equilibria in this context. We say that
member A contributes to public good j if gAj > 0. We then have the following
result:
Proposition 2 (Types of Equilibrium). Let mA be the number of public
goods to which A contributes, and mB the number of public goods to which B
contributes. In general, mA +mB  m+ 1; that is, there is at most one public
good to which both contribute. If all public goods are bought, eithermA+mB = m
or mA +mB = m+ 1:
3Or equivalently, a function of the sum of the contributions. A more general assumption
would be to allow for the households consumption of public goods to be a function of the
individual contributions. This would make it possible to capture for instance semi-publicness
for some goods. We do not allow for this.
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Proof. The rst order conditions (2) give a set of
 
n+mA   1 equalities for
A. A similar argument applied to agent B generates another set of a set of 
n+mB   1 equalities. With the budget constraint, we thus have 
2n+mA +mB   1
equalities in (2n+m) unknowns. Since these equations are algebraically inde-
pendent, they cannot in general be simultaneously fullled unless mA+mB 1 
m. Finally, if mA +mB < m then there must be a commodity to which no one
contributes.
Note that the result is only general(or generic), in the sense that it is al-
most alwayssatised. Still, it is possible, for arbitrary preferences, that it is vio-
lated at specic points (but then typically these points are locally unique). Also,
one can nd preferences such that the result is violated upon an open set; this
is the case, for instance, when public goods are separable and (sub)preferences
over the public goods are identical across individuals, a case studied in Lechene
and Preston (2005). Note, however, such preferences are not robust to local per-
turbations. A precise statement of these genericityconditions would require
some heavy mathematical apparatus (transversality theory) that is outside the
scope of this paper; instead, a detailed example is provided below.
The next proposition states explicitly an implication for the casemA+mB =
m+ 1.
Proposition 3 (Local Income Pooling) When there is one public good to
which both household members contribute (mA +mB = m + 1), redistributions
of income between household members which do not exceed the amount of each
individuals contributions to the jointly contributed public good have no e¤ect on
households expenditures.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that both agents contribute to
commodity 1, while A is an exclusive contributor for commodities 2; :::; p and
B is an exclusive contributor for commodities p + 1; :::;m (where 2  p  m).
Then the (2n+m) vector
 
qA; qB ; Q

satises n+p 1 rst order conditions for
A, n+m p rst order conditions for B plus the global budget constraint. None
of these conditions depend on individual incomes (all but the last do not depend
on incomes at all and the last only depends on aggregate income). Hence the
set of solutions does not depend on individual incomes.
Proposition 3 generalizes the remarkable result rst obtained by Warr (1983)
in the case of one public good, then also by Kemp (1984), and Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian (1986) for several public goods.4 It shows, in particular,
that a given household may or may not pool income; in fact, pooling behavior
4Kemps method of proof relies on counting equations and unknowns, but assumes that all
agents contribute to all public goods, which is impossible in general. Bergstrom, Blume and
Varian use a revealed preference argument. Lechene and Preston (2005) give a proof in the
same spirit as the proof provided here, but at an interior equilibrium, that is under restrictions
on preferences so that all agents contribute to all public goods.
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obtains endogenously as the outcome of non-cooperation for certain ranges of
the relevant parameters. A heterogeneous sample of households may therefore
contain pooling and non-pooling households, a fact which has important
implications for empirical work.
Proposition 2 is more original. It states that in a non-cooperative setting, in-
dividuals specialize in funding public goods, so that all public goods but maybe
one, are exclusively funded by one individual. Proposition 2 can thus be in-
terpreted as a separate spheres result: in practice, each publicly consumed
commodity (but maybe one) belongs exclusively to the sphere of inuenceof
one of the household members.
Two remarks are however in order. First, in contrast with Lundberg and
Pollaks approach, respective spheres are endogenously determined. Specically,
for any equilibrium vector
 
qA;qB ;Q

, for any public good j which is consumed,
we have the following characterization (assuming that both people buy the rst
private good):
 either @UA=@Qj
@UA=@qA1
< 1; then @U
B=@Qj
@UB=@qB1
= 1 and B is an exclusive contributor
(so that commodity j belongs to Bs sphere)
 or @UA=@Qj
@UA=@qA1
= 1 and @U
B=@Qj
@UB=@qB1
< 1, then A is an exclusive contributor (so
that commodity j belongs to As sphere)
 or @UA=@Qj
@UA=@qA1
=
@UB=@Qj
@UB=@qB1
= 1, in which case both A and B contribute; from
Proposition 2, this can will usually only happen for one commodity In this
case we have income pooling.
In other words, for all public goods but possibly one, the marginal willingness
to pay (out of private consumption) of one of the partners is smaller than the
marginal cost (here normalized to one).
The seond remark is that the denition of the spheresis not xed; it de-
pends on individual incomes. For instance, when a members income is low
enough, this member will in general contribute to no public good. This implies
that any change in income distribution that a¤ect the members respective in-
comes may change the denition of the spheres. A precise illustration is given
below in a specic example.
Before turning to the example, we discuss briey the possible implications
of this analysis if agents use a bargaining models that takes the non-cooperative
outcome as a breakdown point. In this case the bargaining outcomes inherit
some of the features of the non-cooperative outcomes. In particular, the same
segments of local pooling will hold for all goods.
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2.4 An example
We now study an example with one private good and two public goods (denoted
G and H for simplicity). Individual preferences are Cobb-Douglas:
uA(qA; G;H) = qAGaH
uB(qB ; G;H) = qBGbH
We denote by As income by  and Bs by (1  ). We are particularly interested
in analyzing changes in demand resulting from variations in the income share 
(keeping total income constant at unity). We assume, as a normalization, that
a

>
b

so that A cares (relatively) more for commodity G and B cares (relatively) more
for commodity H.
The rst order conditions give:
a
qA
G
 1; q
A
H
 1 for A, and
b
qB
G
 1;  q
B
H
 1 for B:
with an equality when the agents contributes to the commodity under consider-
ation. Now assume, rst, that A is contributing to G and that B is contributing
to H. Then
a
qA
G
= 
qB
H
= 1
If, moreover, A also contributes to H, then  q
A
H = 1, hence
H
G =
a
 . Similarly,
if B also contributes to G, then b q
B
G = 1, hence
H
G =
b
 . It follows that A
and B cannot simultaneously contribute to both public goods unless a =
b
 .
This is exactly the meaning of the in general qualication in the statement
of Proposition 2: such a condition is almost never satised, and when it is
the situation is knife-edgeand not robust to innitesimal perturbations (here,
innitesimal changes in the parameters).
The exact solutions as a function of  are given by:
 if
  b
a+ ab+ a + b
then A contributes to no public good, B contributes to both public goods
and
qA = ; qB =
(1  )
1 + b+ 
;G =
b (1  )
1 + b+ 
;H =
 (1  )
1 + b+ 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 if
b
a+ ab+ a + b
<   b (a+ 1)
a+ ab+ a + b
then A contributes to G, B contributes to G and H, and
qA =
b
a+ ab+ a + b
; qB =
a
a+ ab+ a + b
;
G =
ab
a+ ab+ a + b
;H =
a
a+ ab+ a + b
Note that, in that case, demand does not depend on , as stated in Propo-
sition 3, since both agents contribute to G.
 if
b (a+ 1)
a+ ab+ a + b
<    (a+ 1)
+  + a + 
then A contributes to G, B contributes to H, and
qA =

a+ 1
; qB =
(1  )
 + 1
;
G =
a
a+ 1
;H =
 (1  )
 + 1
This is the pure separate spherecase, in which each public good is funded
by one agent.
 if
 (a+ 1)
+  + a + 
<    (+ a+ 1)
+  + a + 
then A contributes to G and H, B contributes to H, and
qA =

+  + a + 
; qB =

+  + a + 
;
G =
a
+  + a + 
;H =

+  + a + 
and again demand does not depend on .
 nally, if
 (+ a+ 1)
+  + a + 
< 
then A contributes to G and H, B contributes to no public good, and
qA =

1 + a+ 
; qB = (1  ) ; G = a
1 + a+ 
;H =

1 + a+ 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It is simple to show that the outcomes are ine¢ cient for all values of  2
(0; 1). At the endpoints the outcomes are e¢ cient since then one or other person
is a dictator. If we take a bargaining model which has the non-cooperative
outcomes as a breakdown point then the household demands for both public
goods will be higher than in the non-cooperative case (with equality at the
endpoints). Importantly, the bargaining outcomes will then have intervals of
income pooling over the same values of  as the non-cooperative case.
These results are summarized in gure 1, in which the horizontal axis rep-
resents the values of  and the vertical axis the expenditures on the two public
goods. We take values of
fa; ; b; g = f5=3; 8=9; 15=32; 1=2g
which gives joinpoints at  = f1=8; 1=3; 1=2; 2=3g. In interval I person A does
not contribute to either public good. As income is transferred to her she spends
it on her private good andB cuts back expenditures on both public goods and his
private good. Thus we see that expenditure on good G falls even though person
A cares relatively more for this good. As an example, transferring income from
father to mother will not necessarily lead to higher expenditures on children
even if the mother cares more for the children. At the value  = 1=8 person
A starts to contribute to good G and we enter an interval of income pooling
(II). As even more income is transferred to A we reach a point ( = 1=3 in this
case) at which B stops contributing to good G. This gives the pure separate
spheres interval III. Intervals IV and V are obvious counterparts to II and I
respectively. This gure shows many of the important features of our model:
 Local income pooling will hold for some values of the distribution of income
but not for others.
 The household demands for public goods are not necessarily monotone in
the distribution of income, even if one partner cares relatively more for
one good than the other.
 The join points for the di¤erent regimes are the same across all goods (we
do not show the private good expenditures but this property holds for
them as well; see the conditions above). This is potentially important for
empirical work; without this property, the chances of successfully devising
powerful tests for the patterns displayed here would be remote. On the
other hand, if preferences vary across women (di¤erent a and  for di¤erent
households) and across men (di¤erent b and  for di¤erent households)
then the join points themselves will be heterogeneous which will have to
be taken into account.
3 Conclusion
We have considered a model of household allocation to di¤erent goods. We
have shown that if preferences are egoistic then the voluntary contributions
9
Figure 1: Household demands for public goods.
game gives two distinct regimes for household behaviour. In the rst regime
there is one public good to which both partners contribute and we have local
income pooling. In the second regime, the two partners contribute to distinct
sets of public goods (separate spheres) and a local re-distribution of income will
lead to a change in household demands. One important corollary of the latter
is that a reallocation to A may lead to a decrease in the household demand
for the public good that A values most. This analysis also has implications for
bargaining models if the household uses the non-cooperative outcomes suggested
here as a breakdown point. In that case the bargaining outcomes will inherit the
local income pooling from the non-cooperative model. Moreover, the analysis
also implies the strong restriction that the only distribution factor5 is relative
income
Allowing for sharing (so that As preferences are represented by a weighted
sum of her utility function and his utility function and similarly for B) leaves
the analysis unchanged, except that we add at (local income pooling) segments
to the demands for all goods at extreme values of the household distribution of
income (that is,  close to zero or unity). This follows since at such values the
high income and caring person will be e¤ectively transferring resources to the
5A distribution factor is a household variable that enters the household demand functions
but does not inuence the preferences of the two partners.
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low income partner and any local re-distribution is simply undone. Once again,
any bargaining model will inherit these ats at extreme values of the within
household income distribution.
The positive and policy implications of our analysis are quite sharp: even if
households do not have a common utility function (the unitary model) they may
exhibit local income pooling for some values of the within household distribution
of income. When they do not pool income locally it must be that they are
contributing to separate spheres. The exact importance of the local income
pooling intervals and the separate spheres intervals will depend on preferences.
For some values of preferences we may have that the household will almost
never respond to changes in the within household allocation of income and that
targeting income will have little e¤ect. We end by emphasising that we stress
the mayin the preceding sentences. We do not make the general claim that
we believe redistribution or targeting does not matter in general - alternative
theories to the ones we have analysed here will give more or less income pooling
and potential for targeting Whether or not households pool income (locally or
globally) is, in the end, an empirical issue.
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